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Carl Rhodes 
Introduction 
Milton Friedman famously said ‘there is one and only one social responsibility of 
business – to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its 
profits’ (Friedman, 1962: 133). The sole moral limit to this freedom was for 
corporations and their executors to conform ‘to the basic rules of the society, both 
those embodied in law and embodied in ethical custom’ (Friedman, 1970: 32) 
and to do so ‘without deception or fraud’ (Friedman, 1962: 133). Friedman was of 
course not just issuing a scholarly commentary, his ideas came to be ‘crystallized 
into a coherent and powerful message of political and economic reform’ that has 
resulted today in the political and economic dominance of ‘a guileless faith in the 
efficiency of free markets and their virtues’ (Jones, 2012: 89 and 19). At play here 
has not only been the expansion of market rationality to all spheres of social, 
political and economic life, but also the establishment of an ethical position that 
configures ‘morality entirely as a matter of rational deliberation about costs, 
benefits, and consequences’ (Brown, 2003: 15). This is a market morality that 
sees the pursuit and enactment of market freedoms by individuals and 
corporations as something that is righteous.  
Nowhere has the reality of this market morality been more starkly illustrated 
than in Google Inc.’s tax dealings in Britain in recent years. Instead of paying the 
standard 20% corporation tax on its US$18 billion UK revenues between 2006 
and 2011 Google paid just US$16 million; less than 0.1% (Public Accounts 
Committee, 2013). The complexity and deviousness of Google’s tax avoidance 
practices garnered widespread criticism in the press, in political circles and 
amongst the general public. ‘Immoral tax avoiders’ was the headline in The Daily 
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Mail (Campbell, 2012). ‘When Google goes to extraordinary lengths to avoid 
paying its taxes, I think it’s wrong’ said Labour Party leader Ed Miliband (in 
Wright, 2013, italics added). Google’s Executive Chairman Eric Schmidt’s 
response to this criticism issued a catch cry for a quite different moral position. ‘I 
am very proud of the structure that we set up’ he opined, ‘it’s called capitalism. 
We are proudly capitalistic. I’m not confused about this’. Echoing Friedman he 
went on record as saying: ‘what we are doing is legal […] I view that you should 
pay the taxes that are legally required’ (in Topham, 2013, italics added). Schmidt’s 
is a moral defense, a statement that champions market morality as it translates 
into the valorization of corporate freedom as both economically prudent and 
morally righteous. This is a morality that attests to a state of affairs where no 
person, community or state should intervene in the pursuit of capitalism; where 
no morality beyond that of the market should impinge on the exercise of 
corporate freedom.  
With this paper I want to dwell not on the specific goings on in Google, but 
rather on considering an ethics that would dispute the market morality that this 
case illustrates. To do this I will consider in some detail Emmanuel Levinas’ 
conception of an-archy (1996 [1968]; 1998 [1974]; 2003 [1968]) as it relates to an 
ethics that involves an ‘opening up of existing political identities, practices, 
institutions and discourses to an Other which is beyond their terms’ (Newman, 
2010: 7). As well as outlining Levinas’ an-archic ethics, its implications for 
corporations will be investigated. This investigation leads to a position where an-
archy forms the basis of justifying dissent as an ethically necessary engagement 
with the excesses of corporate freedom (cf. Ziarek, 2001). Such engagement 
forms a ‘politics of disturbance’ (Caygill, 2002) that pursues a horizon of radical 
democracy (Newman, 2011) through critique, resistance and opposition to the 
self-interested sovereignty of business and to the pretense of corporate 
immutability in the name of capitalism.  
Ethical anarchy 
In his paper ‘Substitution’ Emmanuel Levinas (1996 [1968]) notes that our 
conscious apprehension of other people is organized in an idealized way. It is 
idealized in the sense that once we seek to understand others we do so using the 
themes and categories that we apply to them. In consciousness other people are 
not individual or particular but rather are understood as they relate to the ‘types’ 
we use to compare and categorize them. Levinas writes that the unknown other, 
in one’s apprehension of it, becomes ‘cast in the mould of the known’ (ibid.: 80). 
Levinas refers to this assessment of others in relation to categories of knowledge 
as ‘thematization’; it is the very basic and unavoidable act of consciously knowing 
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another person. There is, however, more to other people than just knowing them 
in one’s own terms. Levinas retains that exposure to the other person is not 
limited to consciousness and thematization. The other person can never be fully 
exposed through symbols, images and language. The spiritual dimension of the 
encounter with the other is, for Levinas, that which exceeds our ability to know 
them categorically; it exceeds any principle that would apply. To such a principle 
Levinas attributes the Greek work arche: an ideal principle imagined to be able to 
define experience prior to its occurrence.  
To engage with another person without or prior to the imposition of a principle is 
to engage that person in proximity such that they are not reduced to being the 
same as anyone else; the other is not thematized. Such a proximous relation with 
the other is, in Levinas’ use of the word, an-archic; it lacks the application of 
principle. He describes this proximity as ‘a relationship with a singularity, 
without the mediation of any principle or ideality’ (Levinas, ibid.: 81). The ethical 
anarchy that this entails is such that our relationship with others cannot be fully 
contained by consciousness and reason. Proximity ‘suppresses the distance of 
consciousness’ (Levinas, 1998 [1974]: 89) and serves to disturb knowledge and 
thematization by invoking both the coextenisve infinity and the immediacy of 
alterity.  
Levinas makes clear that he is not using the term anarchy to refer to ‘disorder as 
opposed to order’ (Levinas, 1996 [1968]: 81), but rather to that state of relations 
that is beyond and before thematization as well as beyond our own conscious 
intentions. Ethically anarchical relations are ‘prior to the Ego, prior to its freedom 
and non-freedom’ (Levinas, 2003 [1968]: 51). Critically, for Levinas, this is the 
point where ethics arises through the reception of a ‘responsibility prior to all 
free engagement’; prior also to consciousness, thought, cognition, logic and 
symbolization (ibid.: 52). Levinas points to a self that is not the same as that 
which is conceived of consciously and represented in discourse; a singular 
identity that defies thematization.  
Ethical anarchy is not something we can organize or know in a conscious 
manner; it is that to which we are wholly passive and which cannot be controlled 
by our intention. In ethical anarchy the ego is stripped of ‘its self-conceit and its 
dominating imperialism” and returns to the ‘passivity of the self that came prior 
to it’ (Levinas, 1996 [1968]: 88). Passivity, as a mode of non-freedom, is not that 
which the ego controls or takes action, but rather that with which ‘the ego can be 
put into question by Others’ (Levinas, 2003 [1968]: 51). This question is ethics. 
The self as located in the ‘an-archy of passivity’ (Levinas, 1996 [1968]: 89) is 
where responsibility arises in that our own subjectivity comes to us first from the 
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other. We are responsible to other long before we ever know ourselves. 
Accordingly, ‘to be a ‘self’ is to be responsible before having done anything’ (ibid.: 
94). Responsibility is not a matter we decide on through the exercise of free will, 
but rather that which we receive passively ‘beneath consciousness and 
knowledge’ (Levinas, 2003 [1968]: 50). For Levinas this anarchy gives us ‘a 
responsibility without freedom’ and prior to freedom. From ethical anarchy we 
get ‘the fact of human fellowship’ (Levinas, 1996 [1968]: 91) before freedom or 
servitude, order or disorder, are even possible (Levinas, 2003 [1968]).  
It is from proximity that our knowledge of the other is relegated as inadequate as 
we see a ‘trace of the Infinite’ (Levinas, 1996 [1968]: 91) in the other person’s 
face. This is a down-to-earth spirituality that shines through the other person 
who is before me and who I cannot adequately know in my own terms. Before 
knowledge lies exposure where one can feel ‘pity, compassion, pardon and 
proximity in the world’ (ibid.: 91) and where the other person ‘concerns me 
despite myself’ (Levinas, 2003 [1968]: 57). But because it is before language we 
cannot ‘know’ this ethical anarchy as if it can be satisfactorily thematized in 
language and cognition. Instead what we recognize is its trace in language such 
that ethical anarchy is necessarily ambiguous and enigmatic; it is ‘signalled in 
consciousness’ through a language that both conveys and betrays it (Levinas, 
1998 [1974]: 194). 
The business of ethics and justice 
Why then might this understanding of ethics and responsibility as passive and 
anarchic be of any relevance to business organizations? To begin consider this we 
can go back to Levinas’ earlier work in Totality and Infinity (1969 [1961]) where he 
specifically addresses issues of labor, work and commerce as being both 
necessary for, and in tension with, ethics. Levinas understands labor as a mode of 
accumulation that enables the self to sustain itself in relation to the uncertainty 
of the future. This sustenance is central to the self’s ability to engage in ethical 
acts of generosity to the other, lest there be nothing to give and nowhere to give it 
from. In Levinas’ words: ‘No human or interhuman relationship can be enacted 
outside of economy: no face can be approached with empty hands and closed 
home’ (ibid.: 172). Indeed, engagement with economy is necessary such that we 
might actively respond to the ethical obligation that we passively receive.  
Labor, thus valorized, still gives way to work, the latter understood by Levinas as 
an engagement in the same ‘thematization’ that ethical anarchy precedes and 
disturbs. With work the self’s particularity is undone as it enters into a system 
where labor is exchanged for money in relation to the work of the others. 
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Commerce exacerbates this as it constitutes a trading of selves through systems 
of exchange and reciprocity. Levinas thus emphasizes that ‘the ethical relation 
can never be an exchange of goods and services with an intended profit or value 
as purpose’ (Muhr, 2010: 77). It is in this sense that work can be considered 
centrally as an activity connected to ethics, while at the same time the 
organization of work through the market mechanism puts distance in place of the 
proximous ethical relation. With work, labor and organization we see the 
inevitable tension between ethical anarchy and the need for knowledge in and of 
the world.  
The tension between the anarchic origin of ethics and the practice of organized 
work has not gone unnoticed in the academic disciplines of organization studies 
and business ethics. On the one hand the ethical necessity of work and its 
organization are acknowledged as a requirement for being to be sustained, it is a 
‘necessary precondition for being able to be “for the Other” in any material and 
effective way’ (Byers and Rhodes, 2007: 239). What Levinas (1969 [1961]: 176) 
describes as the ‘anonymous field of economic life’ operates through ‘a humanity 
of interchangeable men’ that does not acknowledge or respect the ethically 
anarchical basis of subjectivity, and as such ‘makes possible exploitation itself’ 
(ibid.: 298).  
Such a possibility emerges in that organization, in its very nature, involves the 
comparison of people, a comparison that requires ethics to be tempered by 
knowledge and thematization (Byers and Rhodes, 2007; Rhodes, 2012). This is 
so because decisions need to be made under conditions of ‘the impossibility of 
meeting the needs to everyone’ (Aasland, 2005: 57). Yet with this comparison 
each individual cannot be approached as distinct and particular in their alterity; 
cannot be approached without the pretense of arche. Once thematized, compared 
and traded, the understanding of others is located in relation to categories, and 
inevitably ‘judgment relative to that category [. . . and . . .] through this move the 
“Otherness” of the Other, the exceptional, is neatly bracketed and “covered over”’ 
(Introna, 2003: 212). What was received passively as responsibility is now solidly 
cloaked by the instrumental functioning of the knowledgeable ego. Even if, in 
this organized scene, an other were recognized in proximity the problems would 
not dissipate because ‘to put one other first is to put all others behind’ (Aasland, 
2005: 75). 
In one sense these considerations of ethical anarchy might lead use to promote 
ethically based justice in organizations (see Aasland, 2005, 2007; Rhodes, 2013) 
in that organizations and those who manage them might become beholden to 
negotiating the demands of all the others in the spirit of recognizing the origin of 
ethics in the anarchic responsibility to the other. This is indeed the predominant 
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response that has been made in relation to organizational and business ethics; 
one that builds on Levinasian ethical insights in order to develop a set of 
normative implications for how organizations might be managed such that they 
enable ‘continuous improvements towards always more justice’ (Aasland, 2007: 
220). That is not to say that such approaches are managerial, on the contrary the 
common thread is a critique of ethical instrumentalism so as to suggest an 
approach to management and leadership that might be different to its current 
state. The focus is on what people who manage organizations might do, for 
example by pursuing a ‘Levinasian managerial ethics’ that would ‘delimit alterity 
as the locus of the ethical and work on unfolding the practical conditions of 
managerial responsibility’ (Bevan and Corvellec, 2007: 213). Managers are thus 
bound to take on personal responsibility in the context of organizational roles 
such that ethics might come to be enacted in organizations in ways that account 
for yet exceed the following of rules and regulation (Muhr, 2008). The ‘ethical 
leadership’ that would follow is one that is argued to be ‘of value to corporate 
business if it is to establish a culture that is not inimical to the kind of 
management behavior that has been associated with corporate scandal’ (Knights 
and O’Leary, 2006: 135). 
Ethical and political anarchism 
While attestations to the need to strive for ever more just modes of organizing is 
commendable, by itself it suffers from the problem of assigning potential agency 
only to those in formal positions of organizational authority; typically managers 
understood somehow as being ‘inside’ and organization and representative of it. 
To begin to work through the broader implications of Levinas’ ethical anarchism 
for business and organizational ethics we can consider its relationship with 
political anarchism. The conception of ethical anarchy that we learn from Levinas 
is not the same as the notion of anarchism in political discourse, even though it 
can said that it ‘concerns and affects politics’ (Abensour, 2002: 5) and has been 
drawn on in developing anarchist political positions (e.g. Newman, 2010). 
Railing against the suffering and injustice invoked by state rule and the rules of 
states, political anarchism works under a conviction that both collectively and 
individually people would be better off without such power-laden intrusions 
(Marshall, 2010). Levinas himself relates his own conception of ethical anarchy to 
this as follows: 
The notion of anarchy we are introducing here has a meaning prior to the political 
(or anti-political) meaning currently attributed to it. It would be self-contradictory 
to set it up as a principle (in the sense that anarchists understand it). Anarchy 
cannot be sovereign, like the arche. It can only disturb the state; but in a radical 
way, making possible moments of negation without any affirmation. The state then 
Carl Rhodes Ethical anarchism 
note | 731 
cannot set itself up as a Whole. But, on the other hand, anarchy can be stated. Yet 
disorder has an irreducible meaning, as refusal of synthesis. (Levinas, 1998 [1974]: 
194n3) 
Underlining this we can concur that the implication of Levinas’ ethical anarchy 
can be formulated as a ‘politics of the trace, a politics of disturbance’ (Caygill, 
2002: 138, see also Abenour, 2002) that is prior to the constitution of an 
organized politics, including anarchist politics (Newman, 2010). More 
importantly ethical anarchy disturbs the state by decentering its authority in favor 
of the authority of and responsibility to the other, to sociality (Abenour, 2002) 
and to the other’s freedom. The disturbance that reverberates from ethical 
anarchy is one that ‘involves the opening up of existing political identities, 
practices, institutions and discourses to an Other which is beyond their terms’ 
(Newman, 2010: 7). Ethical anarchism is thus political not because it necessitates 
a particular political and ideological position (anarchist or otherwise) but rather 
because it undermines the authority of any such position by calling it into 
question. The solid ground of one’s own pretense to such authority retreats in the 
name of the other person. 
While Levinas states that his ethical anarchy is prior to the political meaning 
attributed to anarchism, that does not mean that anarchism cannot be 
reconsidered in relation to that prior relation; in other words it is possible to read 
Levinas, as a non-anarchist, in an anarchist tradition (Jun, 2012). In particular a 
‘postanarchist’ appreciation of Levinas is one that is ‘thoroughly compatible with 
the anarchist ethos of permanent suspicion towards authority’ (Newman, 2010: 
53) and the insistence that ‘a program of resistance must be ongoing, fluid, and 
ever-vigilant’ (Jun, 2012: 113). Translated organizationally, this means that what 
might be stimulated by ethical anarchism is not just about the internal re-
organization of managerial action, but rather a disturbance of organizational 
order – of assumed organizational sovereignty – that arrives from the outside, 
from ethical anarchy. In the service of business ethics the postanarchist drive for 
the ‘political disturbance of state sovereignty’ (Newman, 2010: 89) can be 
translated as the political disturbance of corporate sovereignty.  
This disturbance, as a feature of the life of organizations, serves to contest the 
corporation through resistance and critique (Fleming and Spicer, 2007). Indeed 
while Levinas’ comments echo the anarchist distrust of state power, such distrust 
is to be extended to contemporary corporations whose power lends them the 
sovereignty to ride rough shot over individual rights and state politics in the 
name of capitalism. Suggested is an ethically-based demand to decenter assumed 
power through disturbance by bringing forth the trace of ethical anarchy. In the 
context of globalized capitalism it is indeed the case that the power of 
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corporations vies with that of states for political domination on a global scale, 
such that corporations can increasingly be seen as political rather than just 
economic institutions. If there are ethical grounds that invoke the disturbance of 
political power then corporate power cannot and should not be excluded as an 
object to be disturbed. 
The ethical anarchy that might inform such disturbance comes before the 
freedom expressed by the ego while its trace disturbs that freedom in demanding 
responsibility to the other without recourse to any ‘authoritative structure’ 
(Caygill, 2002: 149); without recourse to organization. Ethics is engaged with in a 
‘pre-conscious, non-intentional, state of affectivity in which the very distinction 
self-other is not yet established’ (Diamantides, 2007: 2). Moreover it is this 
relation that asserts and identifies the ‘weakness or defectiveness of the ego’ 
(ibid.). Specifically, ethical anarchy is an ‘affective excess to the ego that opens it 
up to the dimension of ethics’ (ibid.: 12); an opening up that occurs through the 
disturbance of the ego’s self-assumed completeness. The idea of disturbance is 
key in that ethical anarchy as present in proximity is that which interrupts the 
hubris of rational and conscious order reflected in and organized by the ego. 
Ethical anarchy tends to politics in the sense that it disturbs politics and tyranny 
(Abensour, 2002) through ‘the continual questioning from below of any attempt 
to establish order from above’ (Critchley, 2007: 123); the order of business 
organizations being a paradigm case. It’s called capitalism? It’s not good enough! 
Ethical anarchy and dissent 
Having reached this point, we can say that the disturbance of ethical anarchy is 
not foreign to political anarchy. This is so because ‘political radicalism ultimately 
finds its origin in this anarchical responsibility to other people’, by standing up 
on behalf of other people and for the other’s justice (Verter, 2010: 80). Ethical 
anarchy ‘affects politics’ (Abensour, 2002) because it suggests the ethical 
necessity of resisting and subverting power and domination. In practical terms 
this ethical anarchy infers a form of political activism where the anarchic 
moment of ethics is ‘the disturbance of the status quo’ (Critchley, 2007: 13). By 
implication activity derived from ethical anarchism would be that which provokes 
a continuous questioning of and resistance to the awesome power of the 
contemporary corporation. Anarchy here is in the form of ‘ideological dissent’ 
(Dunphy, 2004) that contests corporate sovereignty and power. This suggests the 
absolute ethical necessity of resistance to corporate power, anti-organizational 
protest, and political dissensus. Such a requirement is not to be based on an idea 
that we might be graced, deus-ex-machina, by a new form of self-management 
where all forms of oppression dissipate; no fantastical utopias. Instead it involves 
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a recognition that the space between sovereign organization and anarchic ethics 
must be maintained. Politically, this favors dissensus as a practical ethico-politics 
over utopianism as an impossible dream. Such an ethics is enacted through a 
‘project of ethico-political resistance and critique that works against forms of 
coercion, inequity, and discrimination that organizations so frequently and easily 
reproduce’ (Pullen and Rhodes, 2012: 12) … and so frequently justify in the name 
of competitive market capitalism. 
It may be the case that ‘corporate leaders also do not like anarchism’ because ‘the 
familiar order of managerial control is lost’ (Martin, 2003: 2) but there are even 
more reasons that they would not like ethical anarchism. These reasons relate to 
how all organizational action would be under ethical scrutiny in a drive against 
corporate sovereignty. This calls for a business ethics that rather than seeking to 
gain the consent of business to adopt it, is based on dissent from the outside. 
This is what we might term ‘anarchic business ethics’, an ethical position 
determined to question the ethics of business without ever pretending that 
business will be ethical.  
Business ethics is not the responsibility of business, it is the responsibility of the 
societies in which business operates, in other words, it is ‘our’ responsibility. 
Such ethics is located in the democratic process especially as it relates an 
understanding of radical democracy characterized by the non-violent expression 
of political differences and a preparedness to engage in political conflict (Mouffe, 
2000). This ‘democracy is a forever-protean process, where resistance to the 
integral logics of sovereignty, law, and capitalism becomes a politics of gesture’ 
whose pursuit does not cease (Springer, 2011: 531). Business ethics does not need 
moralistic managers or do-gooding CEOs, it needs a civil society that will disturb 
corporate power in the name of ethical anarchism, and that is in opposition to 
the imposition of sovereign corporate power justified by neoliberalism. While it 
is clearly the case that the focus of much recent politics is on consensus based 
engagement it is through political dissensus that this can be realized (Mouffe, 
2000). In one manifestation this is the role taken up by political activists and 
protestors against neoliberalism (Graeber, 2002). But the seeds are present too 
in more general realms of civil society, ethical anarchism can emerge through 
both radical and liberal politics.  
Response to Google’s tax avoidance is one recent example of civil dissent, as are 
public debates over executive remuneration in the finance sector and questions 
over corporate funding of right wing political parties. In each case what is 
disturbed is the normalization of corporate greed and the arrogance of corporate 
freedom afforded by neoliberalism. In terms of tax avoidance the ethical affront 
is to a corporation that believes it can rise above civil society to take what it wants 
ephemera: theory & politics in organization  14(4): 725-737 
734 | note 
without responsibility for contributing in the ways that others have to. The 
pursuit of the self-interest of the corporate self is the ethos in question. It’s called 
capitalism! Even the state has attempted to intervene, with CEOs of the world’s 
most respectable companies being castigated over tax avoidance by ministers of 
the British Parliament at the Public Accounts Committee in 2013 (see Public 
Accounts Committee, 2013).  
The close relations between corporate power and the contemporary democratic 
state (for example, in Britain) however suggest that the capacity of the state to 
adequately disturb corporate power are limited. What is important though, and 
what would no doubt attract the attention of political parties, is that these are not 
matters just of minority or radical politics, but are of concern to many citizens. 
Such matters make headlines in the press, and families discuss them after the 5 
o’clock news. It might even be seen if such matters become the subject of debate 
in University classrooms or on the ephemeral pages of academic journals. These 
are but a few brief examples, but they serve to illustrate that business ethics 
reaches its apogee in the public sphere, in democracy, and it is here that it can be 
best developed and potentially even radicalized. It is in this sphere that business 
ethics must be located as a form of disturbance to corporations. It is in this 
sphere that it should be practiced and researched. 
Conclusion 
If we remove the normative dimensions, it seems that Milton Friedman was 
partly right: the primary responsibility that business takes is to make profits, 
although the question of whether this is done within ethical custom is 
questionable. It’s called capitalism! As Friedman’s credo is upheld with stated 
pride through the networks of globalized neoliberal capitalism one might wonder 
what might be left for responsibilities to anything other than profit, or to anyone 
other than the mythical shareholder. One direction is to expect businesses 
themselves to embrace a broader set of social responsibilities and ethical 
demands as if moved by the goodness of their corporate hearts. The evidence that 
this might happen is wafer thin (see Fleming and Jones, 2013). But outside of the 
clutching hands of business, business ethics can be conceived of as materializing 
in a politics of resistance to organizations (Pullen and Rhodes, 2013) that is 
exercised in the context of a radical democracy formed through dissent (Ziarek, 
2001). This is a vision of radical democracy that attests to the ethical demand to 
disturb authoritarian and exploitative institutions without assuming that the state 
is the center of democracy (Newman, 2010). It is in civil society itself, in our 
collective relations, that ethical anarchism is to be found and hence where 
political action in response to it emerges in one way or another. This is a 
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business ethics of the street, not of the boardroom. A business ethics of the 
citizen and not the executive.  
The ‘market fundamentalism’ that rings through Schmidt’s pride in an inevitable 
capitalism is precisely the form of neoliberal ideologizing that an anarchic 
business ethics would seek to undermine. In question is the ideology that 
neoliberal capitalism is the right and only ‘possible direction for human 
historical development’ (Graeber, 2009: 3). It’s called capitalism! So justified in 
the words of Google’s CEO that he can assert that his organization is proud of 
being capitalistic. In direct contention to such self-important hubris, it is in the 
spirit of human fellowship and respect that ethical anarchy teaches us we might 
have a healthy disrespect for the ethical possibilities of a single sovereign 
institution or organization. It teaches us too that business ethics is far too 
important to be left in the hands of business. Work and commerce are needed 
for ethics to be sure, but through their organization on a global level we 
encounter the inherent possibilities of oppression, exploitation, discrimination, 
deception, greed and selfishness on a huge scale. All justified so long as they can 
be conducted without contravention of the laws of the state. It is the trace of the 
ethically anarchical appreciation of the other person that might lead us away 
from and against such possibilities; a primal respect for the unknowability of the 
other. This ethical anarchy prompts the need to disturb and decenter corporate 
power, lest it continues to get carried away with itself. It is this political 
disturbance that marks the space of an anarchical business ethics that practices 
political anarchism. 
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